

### The Green Deal and the Future of Climate Policy

### A Pigovian Opportunity for the EU?

Prof. Dr. Ottmar Edenhofer 11 November 2020 Uni-Dialog LMU







## The 46. President of the United States



Joe Biden



### Concrete measures....

- Environmental Protection Agency ("make EPA great again!")
  - Develop a more ambitious version of Obama's Clean Power Plan for the electricity sector
  - Goal: Net-zero emissions electricity by 2035
  - Recalculation of the Social Costs of Carbon (SCC) by the EPA
- Department of Transportation
  - Development of rigorous new fuel economy standards aimed at ensuring 100% of new sales for light- and medium-duty vehicles will be electrified.



## ...also constitutionally possible:

- Put an end to Trump's oil and gas development bender on public land, reimposing protections and encouraging safe development of renewable energy.
- Restore the "waters of the United States" (WOTUS) rule to prevent water pollution.
- Restore and strengthen the rules on methane leakage from oil and gas operations that Trump rolled back.
- Ensure that Federal Reserve, and the financial system more broadly, take climate risk into account, channeling investment away from carben-intensive projects.

### $\rightarrow$ He could even declare climate change a national security



## International climate policy measures:

- Rejoining the Paris Agreement.
- Rejoining WHO.
- Push forward international agreements around deforestation, plastics or other climate-related issues.
- Convene smaller "clubs" of willing nations to hasten the development of key clean energy technologies or develop policies to address environmental migration.
- Development of strategies for coping with migration caused by climate change.



## Where congress can put the brakes on:

- Biden needs the approval of Congress for the introduction of a national climate protection plan and for the NDC.
- The achievement of emission neutrality by 2050 can only succeed if Congress supports this.
- Investments of the planned 2 trillion US\$ for the decarbonization of electricity, transport, industry etc.
- No Green Deal in the original design!



### The new Ludwig Erhard of climate



Minister Peter Altmaier using Tesla's Supercharger in front of the MCC building in Berlin last Thursday



Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie

> 20 konkrete Vorschläge zur Stärkung von Klimaschutz und Wirtschaftskraft

Friday, 11<sup>th</sup> September 2020

#10. Reaching the climate targets will primarily be achieved through **marketbased measures**. To this end, the **European emissions trading system and the national CO<sub>2</sub> pricing system** will be reformed.

## State of the Union 2020 - The Green Deal



#### Ursula von der Leyen



Actions	Indicative Timetable <sup>1</sup>
Climate ambition	
Proposal on a European 'Climate Law' enshrining the 2050 climate neutrality objective	March 2020
Comprehensive plan to increase the EU 2030 climate target to at least 50% and towards 55% in a responsible way	Summer 2020
Proposals for revisions of relevant legislative measures to deliver on the increased climate ambition, following the review of Emissions Trading System Directive; Effort Sharing Regulation; Land use, land use change ind forestry Regulation; Energy Efficiency Directive; Renewable Energy Directive; $CO_2$ emissions performance standards for cars and vans	June 2021
Proposal for a revision of the Energy Taxation Directive	June 2021
Proposal for a carbon border adjustment mechanism for selected sectors	2021

[T]he Commission will [...] review and propose to revise where necessary, all relevant climate-related policy instruments. This will comprise the **Emissions Trading System**, including a possible **extension of European emissions trading to new sectors**[...]

## International Climate Policy - COP 26?



UN Sectretary General António Guterres



Secretary General UNFCCC Patricia Espinosa Cantellano



## Can Pigovian taxation rise to its historic opportunity?

"The Economics of Welfare" (1920)



Arthur Cecil Pigou (1877-1959)



- Recent developments (national, EU, and international) point to a historic opportunity for **carbon pricing** to become the **guiding principle** of future climate policy.
- In the past 100 years, the following consensus has emerged: Whilst Pigovian taxation is highly desirable from a theoretical perspective, its political feasibility is essentially zero.
- I shall argue that the consensus is somewhat (!) spurious in that implementing Pigovian taxes is not as outlandish an endeavor as the consensus

## Examining the consensus: Winnowing the spurious from the sound

I will use the term Pigovian Taxation in the following sense: With taxation, I refer to direct pricing - in contrast to indirect pricing via emissions trading. A price collar is subsumed under direct pricing.

In what follows, I will defend two claims:

(i) There are sound theoretical reasons for calling the political **feasibility** of Pigovian taxation into question.

(ii) There is a "Pigovian Opportunity" at three different levels: national, EU and international.



## The sound part of the consensus: the difficulties of implementing Pigovian taxation

- Uncertainties about marginal benefits, e.g. the social costs of carbon.
- **Regressive distributional** impacts on poor households.
- Fragmented responsibilities of ministries lead to excessive focus on sector-specific policies and/or technology policies.
- Committment problems might require sector-specific and/or technology policies.
- Lack of acceptance/commodification objection: e.g. carbon pricing and carbon markets are perceived as repugnant by some environmental groups.
- Incomplete international cooperation.



# Pigovian taxation in the wild: A drama in three acts

1) National policies: The German Case

- 2) EU Climate Policy: Transformation of the energy and transport sectors
- 3) International Climate Policy: Coal, Capital and Cooperation



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## A Pigovian opportunity for Germany?

Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie

> 20 konkrete Vorschläge zur Stärkung von Klimaschutz und Wirtschaftskraft

2. Zur Erreichung von Generationengerechtigkeit wird in der Charta das Ziel der Klimaneutralität bis spätestens 2050 festgeschrieben. Die Minderungsziele bis 2050 werden schon jetzt in konkrete Minderungsziele für jedes einzelne Jahr zwischen 2022 und 2050 aufgeteilt und festgelegt. Dabei werden die anstehenden Beschlüsse der Europäischen Union zu den Treibhausgaszielen 2030 berücksichtigt und umgesetzt.

Friday, 11<sup>th</sup> September 2020

 Das Erreichen der Klimaziele erfolgt vorrangig durch marktwirtschaftliche Maßnahmen. Hierzu werden der europäische Emissionshandel und die nationale CO<sub>2</sub>-Bepreisung entsprechend reformiert.

#10. Reaching the climate targets will **primarily** be achieved through **market-based measures**. To this end, the European emissions trading system and the national **CO<sub>2</sub> pricing system** will

be reformed.

## The German National Emissions Trading Scheme



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### Distributional concerns are only partially addressed

Costs in 2025 (carbon price of 55 Euro)



### Inefficient sector-specific policies



Source: Edenhofer et al (2018), based on OECD data

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### "The world is second best, at best" (Dani Rodrick)

Problem	Steps towards a solution
Uncertainty about Social Costs of Carbon	Setting prices which are consistent with quantity targets
Distributional concerns	No per-capita recycling, but reduction of regressive energy taxes
Repugnant markets	Price floor mimicks direct pricing
Inefficient sector-specific policies	"Climate Cabinet" - instead of fragmented responsibilites of ministries
Commitment device	The BEHG + EU Green Deal



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## EU Green Deal: A regulatory tidal wave?

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Proposal for a revision of the Energy Taxation Directive	June 2021
Proposal for a carbon border adjustment mechanism for selected sectors	2021

https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/europeangreen-deal-communication-annex-roadmap\_en.pdf

- The **good** news: Everything is up for reform!
  - Proposals for revision of EU-ETS and ESR (Non-ET)
- The **bad** news: Everything is up for reform!
  - A period of substantial regulatory uncertainty lies ahead
  - Also includes energy and industrial policies, major interaction with climate policy

## The European Green Deal - Muddling through



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- EU Commission will tighten the emissions target to 50-55%.
- Then, Germany has to increase its emissions reduction target in the non-ETS sector from 38% to 50%, compared to the 2005 level.

Source: Pahle et al 2020

### The European Green Deal - A Pigovian Moment?

Industry Buildings Energy Transport emission reduct. in Germany [%] 27 -38 52 **Power prices** Accelerated -50 **Carbon leakage** coal phase out 72 -55 Border adjustment mech. **Technology policy Compensation measures International offsets Pressure** points light moderate high

**Flexibility non-ETS** 

**ETS** 

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non-ETS

- EU Commission will tighten the emissions target to 50-55%.
- All additional emissions reductions necessary to tighten target in EU-ETS.

Source: Pahle et al 2020

### Enormous inefficiencies due to sectorspecific policies



## The changing face of European fiscal federalism

"The Union will over the coming years work towards reforming the

own resources system and introduce new own resources."



→ The EU should use ETS revenues to generate own resources.



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## Fiscal federalism influences the political economy of climate policy instruments



EU now has a **vested interest in negotiations on climate instruments** (e.g. interest in an ETS carbon price floor)

The EU can use own resources for **increasing support from member states** 





**Perspective of MS (e.g. Germany)** Example: EU ETS carbon price floor

#### <u>Status quo</u>

revenues

expansion

Receives full revenues from auctioning

Price floor increases

Financial interest in a

price floor/sectoral

#### Possible future

Receive maximum amount from auctioning



No financial interest in a price floor/sectoral

expansion

## The EU's fiscal-federal structure and MS' fiscal preferences for the full integration of non-ETS sectors

	Description of options		Assessment based on MS'	
	ETS sectors	non-ETS sectors	fiscal interests	
1	1 one ETS across all sectors		EU could demand part of the	
2	ETS	harmonized taxes	revenues as own resources	
3	ETS	second European ETS / National ETS	Harder for the EU to justify	
4	ETS	coordinated minimum prices	interesting for MS	
$\Box$		→ Increased risk that national fiscal in criteria (efficiency and effectivity).	terests outweigh other evaluation	
788	Technische MCC Mercator Research Institute on		27	

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## Auction revenues might be overestimated...

Figure 4: Possible allocation of ETS revenues and structure of EU resources (net of debt repayment) under scenario 5



- 80 % of allowances would be auctioned off
- Half of the transport and agriculture sectors would be covered
- "Decarbonization" price scenario

Source: Bruegel.

Fuest, C., Pisani-Ferry, J. (2020), Financing the EU: New Context, New Responses. Bruegel, Policy Constribution, Issue n°6, September



... because Negative Emission Technologies (NETs) will reduce the carbon price and require (after 2050) additional funds

- NETs are required for carbon neutrality. After 2050, net negative emissions are necessary to limit global mean temperature to well below 2°C.
- Net zero emissions by 2050 need investments in NETs, even before 2050.
- NETs will lower price in the EU-ETS depending on their marginal abatement costs.
- After 2050, only NETs can enter the market; suppliers of NETs have to be paid according to their marginal abatement costs, eg. via auctions.
- After 2050, the Pigovian tax has to become a Pigovian subsidy. This subsidy requires another source of revenues.



# Beware: Turning a forward-looking reform agenda into a status-quo-preserving mess

- Instead of uniform prices, unleashing a regulatory tidal wave, e.g. excessive focus on technology standards.
- Conflict over revenue generation between EC and MS prevents the implementation of consistent and fully integrated ETS.
- Under-investment in NETs because auction revenues are overestimated.



## The EU is the archetypal second-best institution

Problem	Steps towards a solution
Uncertainty about carbon prices	Price floor, Market Stability Reserve
Distributional concerns	Coordinated national tax reform
Repugnant markets	Price floor mimicks direct pricing
Inefficient sector-specific policies	Incremental integration of EU ETS and Non-ETS. NETs remain an unresolved problem
Commitment device	Independent European Carbon Bank
Cooperation	Explicit and implicit transfers



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### Carbon Pricing on a global scale

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## Coal-fired plants - large fiscal multiplier?



Steckel et al (2020)

## The problem of the cost of capital



Note: Underlying model calculation (Hirth and Steckel 2016) is calibrated for a typical emerging market.



- Contour lines show the expected share of renewable energies, given a certain CO<sub>2</sub>-price and certain capital costs (WACC).
- Vertical lines show the average capital costs for investments in renewables in selected countries and regions.
- Capital costs affect the effectiveness of a CO<sub>2</sub>-price!

Steckel et al., MCC

### The international coal problem at a glance

6-3





## Paradigm shift in international climate policy is necessary and possibl<sup>14.202</sup>



## The strategic dimension of financing global public goods

Ulrike Kornek <sup>Aª</sup>⊠, Ottmar Edenhofer <sup>a, b, c</sup>⊠

https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.euroecorev.2020.103423



### Handelsblatt

#### GREEN DEAL

### Merkel-Berater Edenhofer empfiehlt verbilligte Kredite für grüne Investitionen

von: Klaus Stratmann Datum: 14,08,2020 19:18 Uhr

Auf dem Weg zur Klimaneutralität sollen Unternehmen verbilligte Kredite erhalten, schlagen Ökonomen vor. Das Geld dafür soll über einen Fonds bereitgestellt werden.





## A Pigovian Opportunity for Europe?

• There is a Pigovian opportunity within the EU because of its ambitious targets and regulatory efforts.

- Crucial to avoid turning a forward-looking reform agenda into a status-quo-preserving (regulatory) mess.
- A (comprehensive) Pigovian price reform at all levels albeit institutionally demanding is a worthwhile endeavor.
- A dialogue between policy-makers and experts is needed. Policy-makers mustn't shy away from a thorough examination of the theoretical underpinnings of policy instruments; whereas experts must pay careful attention to the limits of political feasibility.

